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Abstract
Cocaine addiction is characterized by impulsivity, impaired social relationships, and abnormal mesocorticolimbic reward
processing, but their interrelationships relative to stages of cocaine addiction are unclear. We assessed blood-oxygenation-
level dependent (BOLD) signal in ventral and dorsal striatum during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in
current (CCD; n=30) and former (FCD; n=28) cocaine dependent subjects as well as healthy control (HC; n=31) subjects
while playing an interactive competitive Domino game involving risk-taking and reward/punishment processing. Out-of-
scanner impulsivity-related measures were also collected. Although both FCD and CCD subjects scored significantly higher
on impulsivity-related measures than did HC subjects, only FCD subjects had differences in striatal activation, specifically
showing hypoactivation during their response to gains versus losses in right dorsal caudate, a brain region linked to
habituation, cocaine craving and addiction maintenance. Right caudate activity in FCD subjects also correlated negatively
with impulsivity-related measures of self-reported compulsivity and sensitivity to reward. These findings suggest that
remitted cocaine dependence is associated with striatal dysfunction during social reward processing in a manner linked to
compulsivity and reward sensitivity measures. Future research should investigate the extent to which such differences
might reflect underlying vulnerabilities linked to cocaine-using propensities (e.g., relapses).
Citation: Hyatt CJ, Assaf M, Muska CE, Rosen RI, Thomas AD, et al. (2012) Reward-Related Dorsal Striatal Activity Differences between Former and Current Cocaine
Dependent Individuals during an Interactive Competitive Game. PLoS ONE 7(5): e34917. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034917
Editor: Carles Soriano-Mas, Bellvitge Biomedical Research Institute-IDIBELL, Spain
Received September 8, 2011; Accepted March 8, 2012; Published May 14, 2012
Copyright:  2012 Hyatt et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The work was supported by National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) grant RO1 DA020709 (GDP) and grant P20 DA027844 (MNP). The funders had no
role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: Dr. Potenza has consulted for and advised Boehringer Ingelheim; has consulted for and has financial interests in Somaxon; has received
research support from the Veteran’s Administration, Mohegan Sun Casino, the National Center for Responsible Gaming and its affiliated Institute for Research on
Gambling Disorders, and Forest Laboratories, Psyadon, Ortho-McNeil, Oy-Control/Biotie and Glaxo-SmithKline pharmaceuticals; has participated in surveys,
mailings or telephone consultations related to drug addiction, impulse control disorders or other health topics; has consulted for law offices and the federal
public defender’s office in issues related to impulse control disorders; provides clinical care in the Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction
Services Problem Gambling Services Program; has performed grant reviews for the National Institutes of Health and other agencies; has guest-edited journal
sections; has given academic lectures in grand rounds, CME events and other clinical or scientific venues; and has generated books or book chapters for
publishers of mental health texts. Dr. Krystal’s conflicts of interest are as follows: 1) Consultant for Aisling Capital, LLC, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, Brintnall &
Nicolini, Inc., Easton Associates, Gilead Sciences, Inc., GlaxoSmithKline, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Lundbeck Research USA, Merz Pharmaceuticals, MK Medical
Communications, Medivation, Inc., Naurex, Inc., Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.; 2) Scientific advisory board/consultant for Abbott
Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly and Co., Lohocla Research Corporation, SK Holdings Co. Ltd., Takeda Industries, and Transcept Pharmaceuticals; 3)
Exercizable warrant options for Tetragenex Pharmaceuticals (value less than $100); 4) Research support to Department of Veterans Affairs for Janssen Research
Foundation (provided drug and some study support to the Department of Veterans Affairs); 5) Derives income greater than $10,000 as the Editor of Biological
Psychiatry; 6) Board Of Directors for the Coalition for Translational Research in Alcohol and Substance Use Disorders; 7) President-Elect for the American College of
Neuropsychopharmacology; and 8) has the following patents and inventions: Seibyl JP, Krystal JH, Charney DS. Dopamine and noradrenergic reuptake inhibitors
in treatment of schizophrenia. Patent #:5,447,948. September 5, 1995; co-inventor with Dr. Gerard Sanacora on a filed patent application by Yale University
related to targeting the glutamatergic system for the treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders (PCTWO06108055A1); and Intranasal Administration of ketamine to
Treat Depression (pending). These potential competing interests do not alter the authors’ adherence to all the PLoS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.
None of the research support listed above was used for this particular study.
* E-mail: Chyatt@harthosp.org
Introduction
Deficits in impulse control and reward processing are hypoth-
esized to initiate and sustain cocaine dependence [1,2,3,4], which
is characterized by favoring immediate rewards of drug use over
delayed non-drug rewards, despite potential negative consequenc-
es [5]. Mesocorticolimbic circuits, involving the dopaminergically
innervated ventral and dorsal striatum as well as orbitofrontal and
anterior cingulate cortices, are crucially involved in reward
processing, and dysregulation in these circuits is implicated in
both impulsivity and cocaine dependence [1,6,7,8,9,10].
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[12,13,14], has been associated with reduced ventral striatal
activity during non-drug reward anticipation or receipt, but the
number of such studies is small and the origins of such
hypoactivity are still poorly defined. One explanation for
diminished mesocorticolimbic activation involves the reward-
deficiency syndrome (RDS) hypothesis [15], which conjectures
that drugs of abuse, due to their potent dopaminergic effects,
normalize ventral striatal dopamine levels, whereas non-drug
related rewards fail to do so, leading RDS individuals to seek
cocaine or other abused drugs. Long-term, chronic cocaine
abuse has been shown, however, to exacerbate underlying non-
drug reward response deficiencies, through remodeling of neural
circuitry [6,16,17,18]. This so-called ‘hijacking’ of the reward
system leads abusers to attribute even greater value to drug-
related rewards at the expense of non-drug rewards [19,20].
Two recent studies found, however, in apparent contradiction
to the RDS hypothesis, greater ventral striatal activity in cocaine-
dependent [21] or substance-dependent [22] individuals, when
compared with healthy subjects, during non-drug reward antici-
pation or receipt. These studies lend support to the alternative
‘impulsivity hypothesis’ [23], related to opponent process theory,
and which contrasts with the RDS hypothesis in that it predicts
greater sensitivity even to non-drug rewards, along with an
insensitivity to punishments [22,24,25]. Such discrepancies in
recent studies of substance abuse and neural response to rewards
clearly indicate that more research is needed to elucidate the
effects of cocaine-abuse on the reward system, and the ventral
striatum in particular, during non-drug reward anticipation and
receipt.
As drug use and other addictive behaviors become habitual,
striatal involvement may shift from ventral to dorsal
[5,26,27,28,29]. Dorsal striatal-related networks are implicated
in habitual behaviors [30], including cue-driven drug use and
craving, and are theorized to contribute to compulsive cocaine use
and relapse [26,27,28,31,32]. In support of this concept, two
recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies
found that increased dorsal striatal activity was directly related to
cocaine craving, either induced by psychological stress (in
abstinent cocaine-dependent individuals in treatment) [33] or
cocaine imagery (in actively abusing cocaine-dependent individ-
uals) [5,10]. Therefore, although cocaine use may be initiated by
factors including trait impulsivity and supported by cocaine’s
rewarding effects, habitual use in the later stages of addiction may
depend less on the experience of cocaine reward and instead be
both impulsively and compulsively driven, via ventral and dorsal
striatum respectively, by cocaine cues that previously signaled
reward [5,6].
Impulsivity (e.g., delay discounting and impaired inhibition)
and theoretically related constructs (e.g., compulsivity, risk-
taking and sensation-seeking) can be quantified using self-report
or laboratory-based measurements [34,35]. Three recent studies
demonstrated that impulsivity-related measures were associated
with diminished ventral striatal activation during reward
anticipation in individuals with pathological gambling [36], in
detoxified alcohol-dependent subjects [12], and in nonalcoholic
individuals who were family history positive (FHP) for alcohol-
ism [14]. In the third study, impulsivity and related constructs
were assessed using a principal-component-based factor analysis
of five self-report and two laboratory-based impulsivity-related
measures [37], which revealed that the multifaceted nature of
impulsivity and related constructs was optimally described by
five factors. One of the five factors loaded most strongly on two
self-report measures (i.e., the Sensitivity to Punishment and
Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire and the Padua Inventory
assessing compulsivity [38]) and was found to correlate
negatively with ventral striatal activity. Such a factorial
approach should provide a means to behaviorally quantify
impulsivity domains in users of other addictive drugs as well,
including cocaine, and explore correlates with brain function.
However, a correlational analysis of a broad range of
impulsivity-related measures with reward circuitry function in
both former and current cocaine dependent individuals has not
yet been reported.
Examining reward response in the context of risk-taking is
important, as increased risk-taking behavior is commonly
observed in individuals with the greatest likelihood to develop
substance abuse or dependence [23]. The Domino fMRI task
was originally introduced to examine the role of the amygdala
in signaling prospective negative outcomes during risk-taking
[39,40], but has also been shown to strongly activate the reward
system, particularly the ventral striatum, as a result of gains
during gameplay [40,41]. Therefore, in studies of substance-
dependent individuals, the Domino task is uniquely suited to
examine both dysfunctional brain reward processing and
behavioral risk-taking, as well as their relationships with the
five impulsivity-related constructs derived from the factor
analysis described above.
Examination of reward system dysfunction in individuals in
long-term cocaine abstinence, to our knowledge, has not yet
been attempted. The inclusion of FCD individuals, who have
been cocaine abstinent for at least six months, in addition to
CCD individuals and healthy controls, is important because
chronic cocaine use can induce changes in brain structure and
function [27,42]. Because the extent to which neural and
behavioral recovery occurs with sustained abstinence is unclear,
inclusion of FCD subjects permits direct comparisons with CCD
individuals and might demonstrate in these subjects at least
partial recovery of brain reward functioning to pre-morbid
status.
Our goals in this study were as follows: 1) examine striatal
activity, both ventral and dorsal, during reward receipt in both
former and current cocaine-dependent individuals versus healthy
controls, 2) assess risk-taking behavior in these same groups
during Domino gameplay and 3) find relationships between
neural reward activity and behavioral risk-taking with five
impulsivity-related factors derived from a factor analysis study.
In keeping with these goals, we hypothesized that both FCD
and CCD subjects as compared with HC subjects would exhibit
dysfunctional reward processing, assessed using fMRI during
Domino gameplay. In particular, in accordance with the RDS
hypothesis, we predicted that both ventral and dorsal striatum
would show less activation in response to gains versus losses
during gameplay in CCD and FCD compared with HC. We
predicted, however, that FCD would exhibit less hypoactivity in
these same brain regions than CCD, due to at least partial
recovery of reward neurocircuitry to baseline. We also
anticipated that both CCD and FCD groups, due to greater
trait impulsivity, would exhibit greater risk-taking behavior
during Domino gameplay than HC individuals, but the FCD
group would exhibit less risk-taking than the CCD group, due
to reduced impulsivity from cessation of chronic drug use.
Lastly, we determined whether activity in these same striatal
regions correlated with subjects’ impulsivity-related measures,
hypothesizing that gain-related ventral striatal activation would
correlate inversely with impulsivity-related factors across groups,
based on findings in previous studies [12,14,36].
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Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Hartford Hospital and Yale
University Institutional Review Boards and carried out at Hartford
Hospital Institute of Living. All study participants provided written
informed consent after the study had been fully explained to them.
Participants were paid for participating in the imaging study.
Study Participants
Participants included n=36 CCD, n=28 FCD and n=33HC
subjects. After removing subjects for excessive reaction times
(discussed later), 30 CCD, 28 FCD and 31 HC subjects remained.
Table 1 (top) shows demographic data; groups were matched for
age, gender and IQ. All subjects were right-handed. Participants
were recruited by word-of-mouth, flyers, newspaper, online
advertisement and drug abuse programs.
All FCD and CCD subjects met DSM-IV criteria for
dependence (for FCD, during previous use) based on initial
screening. For inclusion into the study, FCD subjects were
required to have ceased all cocaine use at least 6 months prior
to the beginning of the study. Abstinence in FCD individuals was
confirmed by self-report, urine toxicology screening, and where
available, information from the substance abuse long-term follow-
up groups that a proportion of subjects attended at the Institute of
Living. For CCD subjects, participation required a positive
cocaine urine test (last use ,72 hours) on the day of screening.
Frequency of self-reported use by CCD subjects in the 30 days
prior to enrollment was as follows: ,2 days: 3 subjects; 2–5 days: 6
subjects; 6–12 days: 9 subjects; 13 or more days: 10 subjects.
Cocaine use data were not available for two CCD and one FCD
subjects. Table 1 (middle and bottom) indicates substance abuse and
Axis-I diagnoses, respectively.
Exclusion criteria for all subjects included: current non-
substance Axis I disorders (e.g., schizophrenia), as assessed by
structured clinical interview (SCID; [43]), current/past major
neurological/physical illness, history of head trauma causing loss
of consciousness, metallic objects in the body and estimated full-
scale WAIS IQ ,70. FCD were excluded for positive urine drug
screen on the day of the scan and HC excluded for meeting DSM-
IV criteria for substance abuse or dependence, except nicotine, or
if their urine tested positive for recreational drugs on the day of
testing. Nine CCD subjects had comorbid opiate use due to
recruitment of cocaine dependent subjects from an outpatient drug
abuse program (see Table 1). Cocaine use data were assessed using
a self-report substance abuse questionnaire based on timeline
follow-back methods [44]. Current and prior cocaine use data are
in Table 1.
Domino Task
The Domino task is an event-related, two-player competitive
computerized game modified from Kahn et al [39] described
previously [41]. Figure 1 provides a graphical overview of the
Domino task.
Participants practiced the game outside the scanner prior to
scanning. Scanning began when the experimenter recognized that
participants understood the game’s rules. A thorough debriefing
was conducted immediately after scanning, where participants
were asked about their emotions and strategies while playing.
Open-ended questions and a Likert scale questionnaire were used
where participants rated responses from 1 (least) to 5 (greatest) for
agreement with statements (see example in ‘‘Results’’ section).
To characterize players’ game decisions, a Risk Index was
defined as the ratio between the number of times a player chose a
non-matching chip, only when a choice between non-matching
and matching chips was available, to the total number of chips
played (again, only when a choice between non-matching and
matching chips was available).
The scanned subject is the player while a computer randomly
generates the opponent’s responses. Subjects were told, however,
that they were playing against a human opponent. Thus, from
their perspective, subjects were playing in an interpersonal
competitive context. Each game contains a pool of 28 domino-
like game pieces. At the beginning of each game, 12 random
domino chips are assigned to the player’s bank (shown face up on
the computer screen), four undisclosed chips are randomly
assigned to the opponent’s bank and a randomly chosen Master
chip shows face-up on the board. The remaining 11 chips are not
used. Each of the player’s chips is either a matching chip (has one
of the two numbers on the Master chip) or a non-matching chip
(has neither number on Master chip).
The player’s goal is to discard all assigned chips before the game
ends (4 min) and, if they attain this goal, they are awarded $10,
paid in cash at the end of the session. Thus, for the purposes of this
study, during each round, discarding chips will be referred to as
‘gains’, while acquiring chips will be referred to as a ‘losses.’
Furthermore, as will be explained below, playing a matching chip
is considered a ‘safe’ move, while playing a non-matching chip is
considered a ‘risky’ move or ‘bluff’. It is only possible to win and to
collect the resulting monetary bonus by occasionally ‘bluffing’ (i.e.,
playing a non-matching chip).
During each round of the game, the player selects a chip to play,
places it face down adjacent to the Master chip and awaits the
opponent’s response. The opponent can either challenge the
player by asking him/her to reveal the chosen chip, or not
challenge, allowing him/her to move on to the next round. Each
round progresses according to the following commands, presented
to the player both visually and aurally: (a) Choose instructs the
subject to mentally select a chip to be played. The player can
decide to pick either a matching or a non-matching chip. This is
the ‘Decision-making’ interval; (b) Ready instructs the subject to
move a cursor (using his/her dominant hand) to their chosen chip.
This is the ‘Ready’ interval. These first two intervals each last 4 s;
(c) Go instructs the player to press a button, as quickly as possible
(note: the Go event duration is the subject’s reaction time (RT)), to
put the chosen chip face down next to the Master chip.
The player then awaits the opponent’s response. This is the
‘Anticipation of Outcome’ interval with a ‘jittered’ duration of
either 3.4, 5.4 or 7.4 s (5.462.0 s) [45]. The opponent’s response
is either (d) Show or No-Show. The former command exposes the
player’s selected chip, revealing whether they played ‘safe’ or
‘bluffed’, while the latter allows the player to discard his/her chip
without exposing its value. This is the ‘Response to Outcome’
interval and its duration is also jittered (5.462.0 s). The next
round of the game starts when the ‘Response to Outcome’
interval ends. The Choose command is then again presented to
the player.
Based on the player’s choice and opponent’s response there are
four possible consequences per round revealed during the
‘Response to Outcome’ interval: (1) Show Matching chip: a
matching chip is exposed and the player is rewarded by discarding
the selected chip plus one additional chip randomly chosen from
his/her bank. This is an absolute gain. (2) Show Non-Matching
chip: a non-matching chip is exposed, and the player is punished
by acquiring the chip just played, plus two additional chips (from
either the opponent’s bank or his/her previously discarded chips,
thus not chosen by the player), for a total of three chips. This is an
absolute loss; (3) No-Show of a Non-Match chip: a non-matching
Reward in Current and Former Cocaine Dependence
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successfully ‘bluff’, i.e., get away with a non-matching choice. This
is a relative gain; and (4) No-Show of a Matching chip: a matching
chip is not exposed and then discarded, so the player is relatively
punished as he/she could have discarded another chip. This is a
relative loss.
Rounds continue until the players win (by discarding all of
their chips) or lose, when either 240 seconds have elapsed, or
they have acquired all 16 available chips from the bank and the
board. Participants played Domino games over two scan runs of
15 min each for a total of 8.3960.61 games (Mean 6 SD).
Participants were told they were playing against the experiment-
er, whom they met prior to the scan, outside the scanner. The
experimenter talked to the participant after each run making
competitive comments about the games just played (such as ‘‘you
really got me this time …’’). To ensure that players were engaged
in the game and believed that winning was possible, if they did
not win during the first run, the first game of the second run was
not automated and the experimenter ‘‘threw’’ the game, ensuring
that the player won. Twenty-nine of the total of 89 players
played a non-automated game (HC, 13 games; FCD, 6 games,
CCD, 10 games); these games were excluded from the analysis.
Games shorter than one minute (5.62% of all games) were also
not analyzed.
Table 1. Demographics, Drug Usage and Axis-I SCID data for HC, FCD and CCD groups.
Demographics CCD (n=30) FCD (n=28) HC (n=31) ANOVA test p-val
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range
Age 37.9 8.1 22–55 37.9 8.1 21–50 35.6 7.4 25–59 F(2,86) =0.887 ns
IQ 97.7 13.3 74–123 99.9 16.2 77–141 107.4 17.8 74–141 F(2,86) =2.931 0.059
Gender (% M/F) 63.3/36.7 64.3/35.7 71.0/29.0 x
2(2) =0.471 ns
Ethnicity (% W/B/H/A) 53.3/30.0/13.3/3.3 60.7/28.6/7.1/3.6 77.4/9.7/9.7/3.2 x
2(6) =7.227 ns
Cocaine Use CCD (n=30) FCD (n=28) HC (n=31) t value
2 p-val
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range
Age at first use (years) 20.5 6.3 13–42 not available N/A N/A
Duration of use (years) 16.5 8.1 1.5–30 11.1 9.0 0.3–29 N/A t(55) =2.37 0.021
Amount used (weekly, USD) $253 $317 $20–$1,400$741 $911 $16–$2,632N/A t(49) = 22.65 0.011
Abstinence duration (years) N/A 4.6 6.5 0.5–20 N/A N/A
Urine Test (pos/neg)
1 20/10 0/28 0/31 N/A
Drug Dependence/Abuse Dependence/Abuse Dependence/Abuse
CP CP CP
Cocaine 27/3 N/A 0/0 25/3 0 0
Alcohol 4/0 13/6 0/1 16/3 0 0
Cannabis 4/3 10/6 1/1 10/2 0 0
Opiate 9/0 1/1 0/0 7/1 0 0
Amphetamine/Stimulant 0/0 0/1 0/0 2/1 0 0
Hallucinogen/PCP 0/0 2/3 0/0 1/1 0 0
Sedative/Anxiolytic 0/0 2/4 0/0 1/2 0 0
Nicotine (daily smoker) 24 2 19 3 2 3
Other Axis-I C P C P C P
Major Depression 0 2 0 1 0 0
Specific Phobia 1 0 1 0 0 0
Panic Disorder 1 0 0 0 0 0
Mood Disorder (SI) 0 2 0 5 0 0
P T S D 01 04 00
Dysthymic Disorder 0 0 1 0 0 0
Bipolar I Disorder 0 0 0 1 0 0
The DSM-IV diagnosis for current or past drug dependence or abuse is demarcated by a forward slash (e.g., 27/3 indicates 27 diagnosed with dependence and 3 with
abuse of the given drug).
A, Asian; B, Black; F, female; H, Hispanic; M, male; N/A, not applicable; ns, non-significant; SD, standard deviation; W, white.
1Day of scan only;
2two-sample t-test CCD versus FCD only.
C, Current; P, Past; USD, United States dollars; N/A, not applicable; PCP, phencyclidine; PTSD, post traumatic stress disorder; SI, substance induced.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034917.t001
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Likert scale score answers to the Domino debriefing statements
were analyzed using non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon rank sum,
Kruskal-Wallis) where appropriate, except for the case when
determining if a given group response to a statement was
statistically significantly greater than the middle score of 3. Here,
a parametric one-sample t-test was used. SPSS
TM software (v15,
SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) was used for all behavioral statistical
analyses.
Subject Exclusion
Subjects were excluded from analysis for mean reaction times
(RTs) (during the Go event) in excess of 3.4 seconds, a value chosen
based on the minimum stimulus duration of the ‘Anticipation of
Outcome’ interval, is jittered (5.462.0 seconds). On the basis of
excessive mean RTs, six CCD and two HC subjects were
excluded.
Impulsivity-related Measures
In a previous study that included many current study subjects
[37], domains for multiple behavioral and self-report measures of
impulsivity and related constructs were examined in At-Risk/
Addiction subjects (individuals either family history positive for
alcohol dependence, or current/former cocaine dependent) as well
as healthy controls (14 CCD, 9 FCD and 21 HC from that study
participated in the current study). Briefly, five widely-used, reliable
and valid self-report questionnaires were used, and were described
in that study: (i) the Behavioral Inhibition/Activation System
(BIS/BAS) [46], (ii) the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11) [47], (iii)
the Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Ques-
tionnaire (SPSRQ) [48], (iv) the Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS
Form V) [49] and (v) the Padua Inventory [50], plus two
computer-based behavioral laboratory tests: (i) the Balloon Analog
Risk Task (BART) [51] and (ii) the Experiential Discounting Task
(EDT) [52].
In our current study, we used the previously identified Factor
structure [37], i.e., we did not perform a new factor analysis, but
rather used the five factor structure implicit in the Component Score
Coefficient (CSC) Matrix calculated in the original Factor Analysis
using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), version 15.0
(SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois). Subjects taking the impulsivity-
related test battery since the previous study, including subjects in
this study, were added to the original database of n=176 subjects
and then new Z-scores for each impulsivity-related test were
computed for all subjects (final n=246). Updated Z-scores were
multiplied by the CSC matrix to calculate new factor scores for
our HC, FCD and CCD subjects.
Functional MRI Acquisition
Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) data were collected
with a T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR/
TE=1860/27 msec, Flip angle=70u, Field of view=22 cm with
a6 4 664 acquisition matrix) using a Siemens Allegra 3 Tesla
scanner. Thirty-six contiguous axial functional slices of 3 mm
thickness with 1 mm gap were acquired, yielding
Figure 1. The Domino game task. The Domino game sequence and corresponding consequences are depicted. At the beginning of
each round of the game the player must decide (mentally choose) what chip he/she will play next (i.e., ‘Choose’, the decision-making interval) and
move the cursor to the selected chip when instructed (‘Ready’ interval). The chip can either match the opponent’s chip (i.e., have one of the two
numbers on the chip match one of those on the opponent’s chip, 6:3 in this example; upper panel, 6:1) or not (lower panel, 5:2). After placing the
selected chip face down next to the opponent’s chip, he/she awaits the opponent’s response (‘Go’ or ‘Anticipation of Outcome’ interval). The
opponent can either challenge the player’s choice (‘show’) or not (‘no-show’). Based on the player’s choice and the opponent’s response, there are
four possible consequences for each round during the ‘Response to Outcome’ interval: show match (overt gain); no-show match (relative loss, as the
player could have been rewarded if challenged); show non-match (overt loss) and no-show non-match (relative gain, as the player successfully
‘‘bluffed’’, that is, avoided punishment). The opponent’s chip and samples of matching and non-matching chips are highlighted (in yellow) for
demonstration purposes only. In the actual scan, the game board and all chips are in color, not in grayscale as depicted in the figure. Also, all chips
are the same size and color.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034917.g001
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during each run, including six ‘dummy’ images at the beginning to
allow global image intensity to reach equilibrium, which were
excluded from data analysis.
fMRI Data
Preprocessing. Imaging data were preprocessed using SPM2
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK).
Each individual’s data set was realigned to the first ‘non-dummy’
T2* image using the INRIAlign toolbox (A. Roche, EPIDAURE
Group; http://www-sop.inria.fr/epidaure/software/INRIAlign)
to compensate for any subject head movement. Movement
parameters for each subject were then screened for excess head
movement (.4 mm). The resulting images were spatially normal-
ized to the Montreal Neurological Institute standard template [53]
and spatially smoothed with a 9 mm isotropic (FWHM) Gaussian
kernel. A high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128 s was applied to
correct for EPI signal low-frequency drift.
Events and Regressors
Functional MRI data were analyzed using a general linear
model (GLM) approach using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). As described previously [41],
from the four game intervals described in detail in the online
supplement, we created ten first-level (subject-level) regressors:
(1) choose-match and choose-nonmatch from the ‘Decision-making’
interval; (2) ready from the ‘Ready’ interval; (3) pick-match and pick-
nonmatch from the ‘Anticipation of Outcome’ interval; (4) show-
match, show-nonmatch, noshow-match and noshow-nonmatch from the
‘Response to Outcome’ interval, each regressor corresponding to
the four consequences; (5) and finally a misc regressor for events of
non-interest including Go events and between-game events, during
which the subject learned whether they won or lost the last game
and then waited for the next game to being. The misc regressor
also included all events occurring during games of less than one-
minute duration. These events were not analyzed.
Regressors were modeled as boxcar functions convolved with
the SPM5 canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) and
included HRF temporal derivatives. Regressors also included the
six movement parameters (translation: x, y and z and rotation:
pitch, roll and yaw).
In a fixed-effects first-level analysis, individual statistical
parametric maps and contrast images were calculated and were
composed of contrasts from the four ‘Response to Outcome’
interval regressors. These include the Gain contrast, a linear
combination of the show-match and noshow-nonmatch regressors
compared with an implicit baseline, the Loss contrast, a linear
combination of the show-nonmatch and noshow-match regressors
compared with an implicit baseline, and finally the Gain-Loss
difference contrast.
Statistical Analyses
We delineated the reward network using a random-effects
second-level analysis one-sample t-test of the Gain-Loss contrast
across all subjects (n=89). We thresholded the resulting statistical
parametric map at p,0.05 family-wise error (FWE) rate whole-
brain corrected. We used the across-all-subjects Gain-Loss contrast
map as an inclusive mask in all subsequent analyses, such that they
examined group differences within the brain reward network only.
We hereafter refer to this inclusive mask as the Reward mask, and
the brain regions it defines as the Reward network.
To explore group differences in the Gain-Loss contrast we
performed a random-effects repeated-measures between-subjects
analysis of variance (ANOVA) in which we compared the three
HC, FCD and CCD groups. We were specifically interested in
between-group differences in Gain-Loss activation in targeted
regions of interest (ROIs), ventral and dorsal striatum, according
to our hypotheses. We first applied the Reward mask, as described
previously, to the results from the one-way ANOVA between-
group Gain-Loss contrast comparison. The statistical threshold for
clusters occurring in ROIs was then set to p,0.05 uncorrected
(due to an anticipated loss of power from a between-group
ANOVA second-level analysis) with a minimum cluster size of
k=10 contiguous voxels (.270 mm
3). The SPM5 toolbox ‘rfxplot’
was used to calculate effects sizes for the random effects group
SPM5 analyses and was also used to create subsequent effect size
bar graphs [54].
Correlation of fMRI with Impulsivity-related Measures
To determine the relationship between impulsivity-related
measures and reward-related brain activity, we performed a
random-effects multiple regression analysis in SPM5 to obtain the
correlation of each subject’s impulsivity-related factor score with
the corresponding Gain-Loss contrast at each voxel. Only
impulsivity-related factors (from the set of five factors described
earlier) that were significantly different among the three groups
were subject to correlation analysis.
As with the between-group ANOVA analysis, we first masked
the multiple regression analysis using the Reward mask. We then
conducted a between-group ANOVA on the multiple regression
results to determine clusters with significant between-group
differences for each impulsivity-related measure versus Gain-Loss
contrast correlation. As with main-effect ANOVA described
previously, we present only those between-group ANOVA
correlation clusters occurring in ROIs, and set the statistical
threshold to p,0.05 uncorrected with a minimum cluster size of
k=10 voxels.
Post hoc analyses were conducted to determine which group(s)
differed in correlation between subjects’ impulsivity-related factor
scores and corresponding Gain-Loss contrast. Statistical thresholds
for post-hoc regression, performed on each group separately, were
set at q,0.05 false-discovery rate (FDR) corrected (restricted to
those voxels included in the Reward network) with a minimum
cluster size of k=10 contiguous voxels. Regression data for
presentation for each group, as before, were further restricted to
voxels in clusters located in ROIs. Data were obtained from the
mean Gain-Loss contrast value of all voxels within a 5 mm radius of




Game information. HC, FCD and CCD groups had
79.766.6, 82.864.0 and 80.665.7 ‘Response to Outcome’ events
per subject, respectively, over the course of their two 15-minute
scanning sessions (group differences, N.S., F=2.363, df=2,88,
P=0.100). The percentage of these events that were Gain events
for HC, FCD and CCD were 50.966.1%, 48.866.0% and
48.765.9%, respectively, demonstrating that ‘Response to Out-
come’ events for all three groups were divided approximately
evenly between Gain and Loss events (group differences, N.S.,
F=1.295, df=2,88, P=0.279). Not including the ‘thrown’ games
(see online supplement), HC, FCD and CCD subjects won
20.2611.5%, 25.6612.8% and 22.8612.6% of their games,
respectively (group differences, N.S., F=1.425, df=2,88,
P=0.246).
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questionnaire were intended to reveal subject’s emotional reac-
tions to the four possible outcomes of each move during the
‘Response to Outcome’ interval (see Table 2). Kruskal-Wallis tests
indicated no differences among the three groups in mean
responses to any statement. One-sample t-tests showed that, for
all three groups, Likert scale responses to both absolute and
relative gains (‘‘I felt glad when …’’) were statistically significant
with regard to agreement with the statements (i.e., mean response
.3) while responses to both absolute and relative losses (‘‘I felt
unhappy when …’’) were not (see Table 2), suggesting that subjects
were more motivated by gains than losses, consistent with previous
results [41].
For the HC, FCD and CCD groups, paired Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests comparing subjects’ responses to statements regarding
absolute versus relative gains (i.e., AS1 versus AS2), and absolute
versus relative losses (i.e., AS3 versus AS4), showed no significant
differences (AS1 vs. AS2, P.0.100 and AS3 vs. AS4, P.0.100, for
all three groups; see Table 2 for AS definitions). Therefore, we
concluded that subjects did not perceive absolute gain and loss
events as more emotionally salient than the relative events. For this
reason, in our fMRI GLM analyses, we grouped the relative and
absolute gain event regressors together as the contrast ‘Gain’, and,
likewise, we grouped relative and absolute losses event regressors
together as the contrast ‘Loss’.
Risk behavior. A two-way ANOVA (364) of Risk-Index
with the two factors Group (i.e., the three groups, HC, FCD and
CCD) and Time (elapsed minutes into game, binned into four one
minute intervals), respectively, revealed a significant main effect of
Time (F=13.802, df=3,258, P,0.0001). Players tended to ‘bluff’
their opponent more towards the game end than beginning. There
was no significant effect of Group (F=0.723, df=2,86, P=0.488)
and no significant interaction between Group and Time
(F=0.539, df=6,258, P=0.778).
Impulsivity-related constructs. A one-way ANOVA of the
five factors described previously [37] involving all study subjects
revealed significant group differences only for Factor 2, ‘Self-
Reported Compulsivity and Reward-Punishment Sensitivity’( F=5.373, df
= 2,86, P=0.030 (Bonferroni corrected)). Post-hoc analyses of
Factor 2 revealed that HC scored lower than CCD subjects
(Tukey’s HSD, P=0.007) and trended towards scoring lower than
FCD subjects (Tukey’s HSD, P=0.054)).
Reaction times. For subjects not excluded from the study for
excessively long RTs (.3.4 seconds), a one-way ANOVA analysis
revealed no significant difference among groups for RTs
(F=2.805, df=2,86, P=0.066; HC: 8776775 ms, FCD:
1,0906921 ms and CCD: 1,29161,020 ms).
fMRI Analyses
We focused fMRI analyses exclusively on brain activity during
the ‘Response to Outcome’ interval, both for the overall group
analysis and for between-group comparisons, with the principal
contrast of interest being Gain-Loss.
One-sample t-test: Across-all-subjects reward
network. A one-sample t-test for the Gain-Loss contrast across
all subjects from the three groups (n=89), showed strong activity
in reward-related brain regions including bilateral ventral stria-
tum, right dorsal striatum (caudate) and left and right lateral
orbitofrontal cortex (see Figure 2, p,0.05, FWE whole-brain
corrected). Table 3, top provides the locations (MNI coordinates)
and t-scores for each region of significant activity.
One-way ANOVA: Main effect of group. The masked one-
way ANOVA analysis of the between-group differences for the
Gain-Loss contrast yielded only one brain region with a group
difference in activity, an ROI cluster (k=18 voxels) in the right
dorsal caudate (p,0.05 uncorrected, minimum cluster size k=10;
see Figure 3, panel A). Table 3, bottom, provides the location (MNI
coordinates) and statistics for the right dorsal caudate region of
significant between-group difference in activity.
Table 2. Statistical group comparisons for responses to four attitude statements (AS).
AS1: I felt glad when a matching chip was challenged (show match: absolute gain)
AS2: I felt glad when a non-matching was not challenged (no-show non-match: relative gain)
AS3: I felt unhappy when a non-matching chip was challenged (show non-match: absolute loss)
AS4: I felt unhappy when a matching chip was not challenged (no-show match: relative loss)
Responses by Group
Group AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4
absolute gain P-value #3
{ relative gain P-value #3
{ absolute loss P-value #3
{ relative loss P-value #3
{
hc (n=31) 3.9761.02 ,0.001 3.8361.00 ,0.001 3.0761.10 =0.369 2.9361.33 =0.391
fcd (n=28) 4.0061.05 ,0.001 3.7961.23 ,0.001 3.2261.28 =0.188 3.2961.27 =0.123
ccd (n=30) 4.2161.07 ,0.001 3.9261.38 ,0.001 3.3961.45 =0.081 3.1861.42 =0.255
Kruskal-Wallis test for Group differences
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4
x
2 1.665 0.874 1.157 0.955
P-value 0.435 0.646 0.561 0.620
From the Domino Debriefing Questionnaire (DDQ) regarding absolute and relative gains and losses during the ‘Response to Outcome’ interval. Responses are Likert
scale for agreement with each statement: 1=’Not at all’ through 5=’Very much’. Top, Table values are the response mean and standard deviation for each group.
Bottom, Kruskal-Wallis test results for group differences.
{=Null hypothesis, mean response #3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034917.t002
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groups at the peak main effect of Group activation in the right
dorsal caudate are shown in Figure 3, panel B. Gain-Loss effect size
is similar for both HC and CCD subjects, but is significantly
decreased for FCD subjects (F=4.764, df=2,86, p=0.011; post-
hoc Tukey’s HSD: FCD , HC, P=0.015; FCD , CCD,
p=0.037).
Impulsivity-related scores: Correlation analysis between-
group ANOVA. A between-group ANOVA multiple regression
analysis of Factor 2 impulsivity scores versus Gain-Loss contrast
Figure 2. Statistical parametric one-sample t-maps of the Gain-Loss contrast for all groups combined (n=89 subjects) that
delineates the ‘‘Reward network’’. Axial slices are labeled from z =218 mm to z =+3 mm in steps of 3 mm. The threshold was set at p,0.05,
FWE whole-brain corrected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034917.g002
Table 3. Statistical parametric mapping results for the Gain-Loss contrast.
One-sample t-test: across-all-subjects, Reward network
Anatomic location of maximum activation MNI coordinates Gain-Loss
xyZ T-Score, df=86
L ventral striatum 215 9 29 9.32
R ventral striatum 12 12 26 9.20
LO F C 239 51 29 7.46
RO F C 33 60 23 7.34
L sup parietal lobe 242 236 39 6.86
R sup parietal lobe 39 236 39 6.54
Threshold: p,0.05 FWE whole-brain corrected, minimum cluster size, k=10 voxels
OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; sup, superior
One-way ANOVA: Main Effect of Group, Reward network
Anatomic location of maximum between-group difference in activation MNI coordinates Gain-Loss
xyZ F-score (df=2,86) P (uncorr.)
R dorsal caudate 18 18 9 5.16 0.0076
Threshold: p,0.05 uncorrected, minimum cluster size, k=10 voxels; masked with Reward mask
Across all groups one-sample t-test (top) and for the between-group ANOVA main effect, masked with the Reward mask (bottom).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034917.t003
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uncorrected, minimum cluster size, k=10 voxels (see Table 4).
One cluster was located in an ROI, the right dorsal caudate, as
shown by the block arrow in Figure 4, panel A, at essentially the
same location as the right dorsal caudate cluster in the between-
group ANOVA main effect shown in Figure 3, panel A (peak
cluster voxels at x,y,z =15,18,0 vs. 18,18,9).
Impulsivity-related scores: Post-hoc correlation
analysis. A post-hoc analysis of the between-group ANOVA
multiple regression results indicated that FCD was significantly
different than HC and CCD. Only FCD had surviving clusters
within the Reward network at a threshold of q,0.05 FDR
corrected (minimum cluster size k=10 voxels). All correlation
clusters within the Reward network for the FCD group, including
those not located in ROIs, are described in Table 5. The ROI
cluster in the right dorsal caudate (see Figure 4, panel B, coronal
slice y =+18 mm), in particular, overlaps the same right dorsal
caudate ROI cluster found in the main effect of Gain-Loss (Figure 3,
panel A). In this right dorsal caudate ROI cluster, FCD Factor 2
impulsivity scores were significantly negatively correlated with
Gain-Loss effect size (R =20.641, p=0.0002; 5 mm radius sphere
centered at x,y,z =18,18,0) (see plot, Figure 4, panel C).
Additional findings. No correlation was found between
abstinence durations for FCD subjects with Gain-Loss effect size in
any ROI. Additionally, we found no difference in HC, CCD and
FCD subjects’ risk-taking behavior during gameplay as measured
using the Risk Index.
Prior psychiatric disorders: Post hoc analysis. To
determine if prior psychiatric disorders in the FCD and CCD
groups had an impact on our findings, we repeated our analyses
excluding the eight FCD and three CCD subjects who had prior
psychiatric diagnoses of mood disorders or PTSD. There were,
however, no qualitative differences between our original analysis
and the post hoc analysis. The post hoc analysis still revealed
relative hypoactivity for the FCD group in the right dorsal caudate
(peak voxel at x,y,z=18,18,9; post hoc vs. original: F=3.73 (df
Figure 3. A. Statistical parametric F-maps (sagittal, coronal and axial) of the Gain-Loss contrast for one-way ANOVA between-group
main effect (masked with the Reward mask). Crosshairs overlaid on brain slices are at located at x,y,z =18,18,9 (peak voxel). Glass brain at top
right shows that the cluster in the right dorsal caudate is only surviving cluster. Threshold was set at p,0.05 uncorrected, minimum cluster size k=10
voxels. B. Effect sizes for Gain (red), Loss (blue) and Gain-Loss (green) contrasts for HC, FCD and CCD groups at x,y,z =18,18,9. Black bar represents
standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034917.g003
Reward in Current and Former Cocaine Dependence
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e34917=2,75) vs. F=5.17 (df=2,86); p=0.029 vs. p=0.008; cluster size
k=5 vs. k=18), as well as an inverse correlation (R=20.645,
df=18; P=0.0021 vs. R=20.641, P=0.0002, df=26) of FCD
impulsivity-related Factor 2 scores with Gain-Loss activity in the
right dorsal caudate. Quantitative differences can likely be
attributed to reduced power in the post hoc analysis.
Discussion
Our principal finding was that while engaged in the Domino
task, involving risk-reward decision-making, FCD, CCD and HC
subjects showed largely similar behavioral and brain responses.
However, a neural between-group difference was found in the
dorsal caudate, such that FCD subjects compared to HC and
CCD showed reduced BOLD activation during response to gains.
Interestingly, in the same region (i.e., right dorsal caudate), only
FCD subjects’ Gain-Loss activity correlated inversely with their
scores on impulsivity-related Factor 2, ‘Self-reported compulsivity
and sensitivity to reward and punishments.’ Scores on this factor
were significantly greater in FCD and CCD than in HC. Gain-Loss
activity in bilateral ventral striatum also correlated inversely with
impulsivity-related Factor 2 for FCD subjects, but not CCD or HC
subjects. Therefore, contrary to our hypothesis, self-reported
impulsivity did not relate to ventral striatal activation in CCD.
Also contrary to our hypothesis, we found no difference between
groups in risk-taking behavior as assessed by subjects’ Risk-Index
scores.
We predicted that, in accordance with the reward deficiency
syndrome (RDS) hypothesis, both ventral and dorsal striatal
activity would be reduced in both CCD and FCD groups, with
CCD showing the greatest reductions in ventral striatal activity.
We did not find, however, any significant activation differences
between HC and CCD for the Gain-Loss contrast in any brain
region, including the ventral striatum, in contrast to both the
RDS and impulsivity hypotheses. We also found no significant
ventral striatal Gain-Loss activity differences between HC and
FCD. It is important to note that although much research on
drug abuse has focused on the ventral striatum due to its
suggested involvement in reward processing and responses to
abused drugs [6,55], such efforts have yielded conflicting results
in comparing drug users to healthy controls during non-drug
reward anticipation and receipt, with some studies showing
ventral striatal hypoactivity [11,12,13] while others reveal either
no differences or ventral striatal hyperactivity in drug users
[21,22,56]. Here, we present two possible explanations for such
conflicting results in these non-drug reward-related studies of
substance abuse might include study differences in: 1) subject
populations and 2) fMRI tasks.
With regard to differences in subject populations, some of the
above-cited studies examined subjects primarily dependent on
drugs other than cocaine, including alcohol [12,13,22] or
marijuana [56]. Clearly, comparison of such studies with fMRI
studies of cocaine-dependent individuals, such as our study,
presents significant difficulties. Additionally, the cocaine-depen-
dent participants in the studies of Asensio et al. [11] and Jia et al.
[21] were recruited from treatment centers and therefore were
actively seeking cocaine abstinence, whereas many of our CCD
participants were not. Thus, participants in these two prior studies
of cocaine-dependence would, in terms of recentness of cocaine
use and/or withdrawal, lie somewhere between the CCD and
FCD groups in our study. Lastly, etiological heterogeneity in
cocaine dependence might be a factor, such that in some
individuals, reward-system deficiency might best explain the initial
motivation to use cocaine (i.e., the RDS hypothesis), while in other
individuals, the initial drive to use cocaine might arise more from
risk-taking and/or sensation-seeking personality traits (i.e., the
‘impulsivity hypothesis’). According to this theory, the two groups
would show opposite changes in ventral striatal activity in response
to non-drug rewards. Studies of cocaine dependence thus far
might have included individuals of both etiologies, perhaps leading
to seemingly conflicting findings.
With regard to differences in fMRI tasks, the Asensio et al. study
involved activation of the reward system with erotic stimuli, and
therefore was not only non-drug, but also non-monetary based,
whereas the Jia et al. study used a monetary-based paradigm, the
Monetary Incentive Delay task (MIDT). Similar to the MIDT, our
Domino task involves monetary rewards, but the reward is
received only at the end of several games of up to four minutes
duration, and only if the game is won. Furthermore, in our study
brain activity was measured during domino chip acquisition or
Table 4. Between-group ANOVA multiple regression results: Gain-Loss contrast versus impulsivity-related Factor 2 scores.
Anatomic location of maximum between-group
difference in correlation MNI coordinates Factor 2 vs Gain-Loss Correlation
xyz F-score (df=2,83) P (uncorr.)
Region of Interest clusters
R dorsal caudate 15 18 0 5.27 0.007
Other Reward network clusters
RO F C 2 1 3 3 29 7.96 0.001
L IFG, triangular 251 39 6 7.10 0.001
R IFG, opercular 57 9 27 5.00 0.009
L middle frontal gyrus 236 60 9 4.59 0.013
L precentral gyrus 251 3 24 5.54 0.006
L precentral gyrus 242 23 57 4.69 0.012
L superior parietal lobe 227 257 66 7.82 0.001
R precuneus 6 266 45 5.17 0.008
Threshold: p,0.05 uncorrected, minimum cluster size, k=10 voxels; masked with Reward mask.
IFG, inferior frontal gyrus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034917.t004
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Therefore, the gains and losses in the Domino task represent a
level of abstraction removed from the already abstract monetary
gains and losses in the MIDT, which, in turn, contrasts with fMRI
reward-related studies that use ‘‘concrete’’ non-drug rewards, such
as food (juice) [57,58,59] or sex (erotic stimuli) [11,60].
Figure 4. A. Statistical parametric F-maps (coronal slices; y-dimension shown) of the one-way between-groups ANOVA multiple
regression analysis of Factor 2 scores versus Gain-Loss contrast. Block white arrow points to the right dorsal caudate cluster that overlaps
with the right dorsal caudate cluster shown in Figure 4, panel A. B. Statistical parametric t-maps (coronal slices; y-dimension shown) for the post hoc
FCD group multiple regression analysis of Factor 2 scores versus Gain-Loss contrast. Threshold was set at q,0.05 FDR corrected; minimum cluster size
k=10 voxels (masked with the Reward mask). C. Plot of the Gain-Loss effect size versus Factor 2 score regression analysis, with each Gain-Loss contrast
value being the mean value in a 5 mm radius sphere centered at peak voxel x,y,z =18,18,0 for each subject in the FCD group. The correlation
coefficient of the fitted line was R=20.641 (p=0.0002 uncorrected).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034917.g004
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chronic cocaine use on the mesocorticolimbic reward system
[61,62,63], and due to noteworthy inconsistencies in findings thus
far, it remains unclear if cocaine-dependent individuals in a given
study sample will demonstrate ventral striatal hypoactivity or
hyperactivity during anticipation or receipt of all types of non-drug
rewards (e.g., abstract or concrete rewards), or only under specific
circumstances (e.g., during early withdrawal, in the context of
continued cocaine abuse, etc.). Our own findings show no
differences between CCD and HC individuals, further demon-
strating the lack of consistency in findings in cocaine studies
examining striatal responses to non-drug rewards. Taken together,
these studies indicate that more research is needed to understand
the apparent differences in findings across studies and the extent to
which specific individual differences might be contributing to these
findings.
We can at this stage only speculate about the possible causes for
our results showing relative FCD hypoactivity in the right dorsal
caudate for the Gain-Loss contrast and the inverse correlation of
Gain-Loss contrast effect size with impulsivity-related Factor 2 in
that same region. Our finding of right dorsal caudate hypoactivity
in FCD subjects during reward receipt will require replication in
future studies, and the interpretation of such results will also
necessitate the collection of additional data on treatment strategies
(both behavioral and cognitive) used by FCD individuals to
maintain abstinence.
We present here, however, three possible explanations for our
findings in the right dorsal caudate of FCD individuals that future
studies might explore. One such explanation is that prior to
cocaine use, FCD compared with CCD subjects, had a different
neural ‘makeup’ within the striatum, including dorsal caudate, or
other mesocorticolimbic regions, such that even after years of
abuse FCD subjects were able to achieve abstinence more easily
than CCD. A second possibility is that individual variation in
predisposition to cocaine dependence might involve dorsal caudate
activity differences that are normalized by cocaine use. Prolonged
abstinence then leads to an ‘‘unmasking’’ of some these pre-
existing differences in dorsal caudate activity. In other words, once
cocaine use achieves a certain chronicity, continued drug use
might be necessary to ‘normalize’ the reward system [64].
Therefore, when cocaine use ceases, underlying dorsal caudate
deficits, such as those involving reduced dopamine D2-like
receptors and elevated dopamine transporters [65], might manifest
during receipt of non-drug rewards. A third possible explanation is
that FCD subjects, all of whom had abused cocaine long-term (.3
months, average 133 months), might have achieved lasting
abstinence through the development of cognitive and behavioral
strategies (e.g., group or individual psychotherapy, self-restraint/
willpower) necessary to substantially reduce and resist cocaine
craving. Such cognitive strategies might have included acquiring
the ability to inhibit craving- and habit-related signals arising from
the dorsal caudate during reward receipt. This proposed
explanation is consistent with recent studies in which substance
dependent individuals were able to use cognitive and behavioral
training to reduce self-reported cravings and ventral striatal
activity when presented with drug cues [66,67,68]. It is also
consistent with recent studies demonstrating that pharmacological
(GABA-receptor agonist) blockade of activity in the dorsal striatum
significantly reduced cue-induced cocaine-seeking in rats, suggest-
ing that similar reductions in dorsal striatal activity would reduce
cocaine-craving in human cocaine dependence [32,69].
Therefore, reduced dorsal caudate activity during reward
receipt observed in our FCD subjects, rather than representing a
dysfunctional response, might instead represent a successful
cognitive strategy that allowed these individuals to remain cocaine
abstinent by not activating drug-habit-associated brain regions.
Our finding that FCD subjects’ scores on self-reported compul-
sivity and reward-punishment sensitivity correlated negatively with
right dorsal caudate activity for the Gain-Loss contrast is also
consistent with Volkow’s cognitive control hypothesis [66]. The
inverse correlation of self-reported compulsivity/reward-punish-
ment sensitivity scores with right dorsal caudate activity might
suggest that the most compulsive FCD subjects need to exert the
greatest cognitive control to maintain abstinence. Additionally, this
inverse correlation indicates that the less compulsive/impulsive
FCD subjects tended to mitigate the between-group difference for
the Gain-Loss contrast in that brain region. CCD subjects scored
similarly to FCD on impulsivity-related Factor 2 (and both scored
significantly greater than controls), and yet did not show Gain-Loss
contrast hypoactivity in the dorsal caudate, nor Gain-Loss
correlation with Factor 2. This result might indicate an unmasking
of underlying dysfunction in the FCD group through long-term
abstinence.
Table 5. FCD group post-hoc multiple regression results for Gain-Loss contrast versus impulsivity Factor 2 scores.
Anatomic location of maximum correlation MNI coordinates Factor 2 vs Gain-Loss Correlation
xyz t-score (df=26) P (uncorr.) R
Region of Interest clusters
R dorsal caudate 18 18 0 4.29 0.0002 20.644
L ventral striatum 215 12 26 3.89 0.0006 20.607
R ventral striatum 15 12 23 3.39 0.0022 20.554
Other Reward network clusters
R IFG, opercular 54 9 24 3.84 0.0007 20.602
L superior parietal lobe 224 257 63 5.18 ,0.0001 20.712
L precentral gyrus 233 23 63 4.03 0.0004 20.620
R precuneus 12 272 57 3.57 0.0014 20.574
R precentral gyrus 36 29 66 4.24 0.0002 20.639
Threshold: q,0.05 FDR correction, minimum cluster size, k=10 voxels; masked with Reward mask.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034917.t005
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speculative, and these results will require replication in future
studies, when taken together with findings that impulsivity
measures correlate inversely with ventral striatal activation in
substance-dependent and pathological gambling populations
[12,13,36], these concepts resonate with models of ventral-to-
dorsal striatal function underlying impulsive-to-compulsive aspects
of addictions [26,29,31,70,71].
Study limitations include reliance on CCD and FCD individ-
uals’ self-reports of durations, amounts and frequencies of cocaine
use, and, in the case of the former users, the length of abstinence.
CCD and FCD subjects, however, provided at least two urine
samples to verify current users were cocaine-positive and former
users were not. Another possible limitation is that nine CCD
subjects had comorbid opiate abuse and/or dependence treated
with stable methadone doses at the time of testing. Re-analysis of
CCD subjects’ fMRI data with opiate users removed, however,
revealed no changes from results presented in Figure 3. Effect size
plots were essentially identical to those depicted in Figure 4, panel
B, and peak difference occurred at the same voxel (x,y,z =18,18,9)
in a similarly sized cluster in the right dorsal caudate. Other past
psychiatric co-morbidity, which were more prevalent in the FCD
group, might be confounding our results. However, the fact that
removing these participants from the analysis did not have a
significant impact on the finding of relative hypoactivity in the
right dorsal caudate of FCD group during reward receipt indicates
that cocaine use rather than psychiatric co-morbidity is the
principal determinant of our results. Also, both current and former
cocaine dependent subjects reported varying amounts of weekly
cocaine use and lifetime durations of use and differences in age at
first use that could potentially impact brain function. Future,
larger studies could examine these factors directly.
We should also note the significant difference in weekly
spending on cocaine between the FCD and CCD groups. While
self-reported weekly spending in the FCD group is considerably
higher than the CCD group, we believe that this difference might,
at least in part, reflect under-reporting by the CCD group. A study
by Harrison and Hughes [72] found that, with respect to recent
cocaine users (i.e., the CCD group), ‘‘over the course of the 17-
week clinical trial, subjects reported cocaine use on 20 percent of
occasions, but tested positive for cocaine (qualitatively) on 68
percent of occasions.’’ Similar studies on self-reported usage in
current cocaine abusers have also shown that such users tend to
under-report [73,74,75]. Therefore, we speculate that many of the
CCD individuals in our study may have been under-reporting
their current usage. This under-reporting might be due to the
desire of CCD individuals to conceal the magnitude of their
ongoing illicit drug use from both law enforcement and from
healthcare professionals. The FCD group in our study, in contrast,
might not have such reservations in self-reporting past cocaine
usage. However, we acknowledge that the significant difference in
self-reported weekly spending on cocaine between the former and
current cocaine groups is a potential confound.
Finally, we should note that we were unable to determine
precisely the last use of cocaine by CCD subjects before their
fMRI scan. A positive urine test for cocaine generally indicates
that the individual had used cocaine within the previous 72 hours
[76]. Due to cocaine’s short half-life of 40–60 minutes [77], this
implies that some urine-positive CCD subjects in our study might
have been in a state of early withdrawal, with symptoms including
depressed mood, fatigue, and psychomotor retardation or
agitation [78] that might have impacted their reward system
response. On the other hand, some urine-positive CCD subjects
might have used cocaine comparatively recently prior to scanning
(,3–6 hours), so as to have hypothetically ‘normalized’ their
reward system at the time of scan. Hence, in CCD participants,
variation in amount and recency of cocaine use and state of
intoxication/withdrawal at the time of fMRI scan might have
added variance or ‘noise’ that obscured underlying differences in
reward system function in these subjects versus FCD and HC.
Conclusions
In summary, during receipts of rewards versus punishments in
an interpersonal competitive game involving risk-taking, FCD but
not CCD subjects showed altered striatal activation compared
with HC subjects. Furthermore, these activation differences were
greatest in right dorsal caudate, a region associated with cocaine
craving and habit-based behavior such as occurs in drug addiction
and, for FCD individuals only, were negatively correlated with an
impulsivity-related factor associated with compulsivity and sensi-
tivity to reward and punishment. To our knowledge, our study is
one of the first to examine brain reward system function in FCD
subjects, i.e., individuals with long term cocaine abstinence (.6
months), thus filling an important gap in the study of cocaine
addiction. Future studies should be directed towards determining
explanations for the persisting significance of the impulsivity-
related factor of self-reported compulsivity and reward-punish-
ment sensitivity in cocaine-dependent individuals, even after
prolonged cocaine abstinence. Finally, future research should
examine the extent to which dorsal striatal function might
represent a target for treatment development in cocaine depen-
dence.
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